JCG-8 Londres 190, Depto. 109 Colonia Juarez Mexico 6, DF, Mexico
September 8, 1966
Consider, if you will, this hypothetical situation:
Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois, a staunch party-lining Democrat with an unblemished record of political services is unable to find a solution to a student strike and falls into disfavor with voters who had elected him with a 90-percent majority in 1962, Congress comes to work at one o’clock in the afternoon shortly thereafter and finds before it a request from President Lyndon B. Johnson that Kerner be removed from office. No advance notice of the action has been given – not even to Kerner or members of his state’s Congressional delegation. The resolution in handed to a select committee, which retires into secret session at which no witnesses are heard. The other legislators, meanwhile, spend 45 minutes or so discussing the Georgia boll weevil problem and plans for a delegation to the Iowa State Fair. The committee returns with a favorable reports and Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who is presiding, calls up the bill for discussion. Three senators speak briefly on its behalf, and it goes through on a voice vote. A newspaperman calls Kerner in Springfield, the Illinois capitals and finds the governor knows nothing of the action. “Only a rumor,” he says. Congress, meanwhile, acting on a list of three nominees submitted by President Johnson, elects one of its own members to replace the hapless Kerner as governor. Total lapsed time from convening to swearing in of the replacement: One hour 55 minutes.
Improbable? In the United States, impossible. And many Mexicans, despite recent historical precedents thought likewise until last month when President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, in a half-afternoon of muscle flexing, revealed the totality of power wielded by the Federal government in this nation, and the flimsiness – you might even say the non-existence – of state sovereignty.
Substitute the name Enrique Dupre Ceniceros, make him governor of the State of Durango, rather than Illinois, and a prominent priista – member of the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional – instead of a Democrat. The forum becomes the Permanent Commission of the Mexican Congress rather than the U.S. Senate. But scant else changes. By presidential initiative a popularly elected state governor has been turned out of office by a Federal legislature.
Dupre Ceniceros’ troubles began with a student occupation of the Cerro de Mercado iron ore mine in Durango, a cattle state in northern Mexico. This strike, which raged from June 2 through late July, was discussed at length in JCG-5, “The Cerro do Mercado: A Lesson in Revolution.” To recapitulate briefly the governor’s role: When students seized the mine in an attempt to force its operators, a Monterrey steel firm, to pay royalties on ore previously extracted without benefit to the duranguenses, Dupre Ceniceros futilely tried to persuade them to withdraw. Rocks showered him when he came to the Cerro. Later, when he called a mobilization of troops in an apparent eviction attempts 20,000 citizens turned out in opposition. In the last stages of the strike, with all sectors of the state firmly behind the students, Dupre Ceniceros stepped aside. Resultantly, the Diaz Ordaz Administration, with red face, had a cabinet member bargain with students, who received just about what they sought.
That Dupre Ceniceros’ days were numbered was an established fact in Mexico even before the strike ended. However, no one outside the familia revolucionaria – revolutionary family – foresaw what course Diaz Ordaz would follow. The last governor to have serious trouble, Manuel Nava Castillo, of Puebla, was allowed to resign in 1964 when he couldn’t handle rowdy university demonstrations. Earlier this year the director of the social security institute was permitted a gentleman’s face-saving when multi-million peso shortages were found in his accounts. Another controversial governor, Leopoldo Sanchez Celia, of Sinaloa, has clung to office despite repeated newspaper prodding that has earmarks of a familia revolucionaria attempt to nudge him aside. (Sample: “Gov. Sanchez Celia denied today recurring reports that…. ”The same “won’t quit” story has appeared regularly since spring.)
Previous administrations haven’t been as gentle. President Lazaro Cardenas, in his titanic struggle with his predecessor, Elias Plutarcho Calles for political control of Mexico, had state legislatures put the axe to seven governors and “permitted” three others to resign in 1935 alone; he fired one each in 1936 and 1937, for a total of 12, almost half the 27 governors in the republic. President Adolfo Ruiz Cortinez, after taking office in 1953, removed three governors whose seating under former President Miguel Aleman had caused discontent. And President Adolfo Lopez Mateos in the late 1950s had a governor of Guerrero removed after terrorism against campesino leaders.
The mechanism for firing Dupre Ceniceros was the Permanent Commission of Congress, which conducts the nation’s legislative business (i.e., the rubberstamping of diazordazian decisions which require congressional approval under the constitution) when the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies are not meeting. The latter chambers, by constitutional provision, can remain in session only from Sept. 1 through Dec. 31; most of the members are PRI officials and officers of campesino groups and labor unions, who hold their legislative seats as a sort of ex officio political bonus. The short term serves two purposes: It permits them ample time for keeping PRI and its sectors in working order, and it discourages development of any true congressional leadership in the country, thereby enhancing the strong central control wielded by the familia revolucionaria through PRI and the presidency. The Permanent Commission, composed of 15 deputies end 14 senators, has “powers” of the full Congress in carrying out legislative functions during the off-season. Careful selectivity of members and the smaller size mean that the commission is more readily controlled.
The manner in which the ruling structure used the commission to unseat Dupre Ceniceros is indicative of the shadow quality of congressional power here.
Just after 1 P. M. on Aug. 4, as commission members gathered in the Chamber of Deputies salon for their daily meeting, the rumor began circulating; “Va a caer Dupre Ceniceros…va a caer.” (Dupre Ceniceros is going to fall…he’s going to fall.) The members received the news with indifference, couldn’t confirm it with their leaders, and filed into their seats, 27 of the 29 present. The Excelsior reporter counted only 48 persons in the entire salon, including members, the press and representatives of the powerful Secretario de Gobernacion (Interior Ministry) who apparently were there to insure that all went smoothly. Gobernacion’s myriad functions including acting as a presidential watchdog over state governments.
The presiding officer, Deputy Alfonso Martinez Dominquez, brought the session to order and turned the execution over to another deputy and PRI wheel horse, Tulio Hernandez, who announced he had a message from the president. The indictment was to the point, and an accurate summary of how Dupre Ceniceros had lost control of his states and its people during the Cerro de Mercado ruckus. The shortcomings cited included:
- A total absence of responsibility and direction by the local powers, and especially as respects the governor…”
- A lack of interest…irresponsibility and ineptitude shown by members of the (state) government…”
- –The necessity for the people of Durango themselves to step into the breach and bypass the state government in a quest for a solution to the strike.”
Diaz Ordaz said he felt obligated to ask the Permanent Commission to declare that constitutional government had “disappeared’ in Durango and to nominate a “provisional governor.” His text said absolutely nothing about removing Dupre Ceniceros before electing a successors, which was not necessary under the two sections of the Mexican Political Constitution of 1917, which he cited for the legislators’ guidance.
The first section simply noted that the president of the Republic has the right to initiate legislations a power shared with the Congress and the state legislatures.
The second section (Article 76, Section V) shows evidence of astute and deliberate wording on the part of the men who wrote the constitution in 1917 in the turmoil of the Revolution. One aim of these persons was to meld Mexico into a unified nation by curbing the free – wheeling powers of the state caciques – political bosses – who previously had set themselves above whatever government happened to be in power in Mexico City. The section says nothing about either the president or the Congress having the power to remove a governor. The constitution were much more subtle. The article, which lists powers of the Mexican Senate, reads in part:
“To declare, when all the constitutional powers of any state have disappeared, that the occasion has arisen to appoint a provisional governor for said state, who shall call for elections to be held according to the constitution and laws of said state. The appointment of such a governor shall be made by the Senate with approval of two-thirds of its members present, or during recess by the Permanent Commission by the same two-thirds majority, from among three names submitted by the president.” The section adds that the provisional governor cannot be elected to the term in the election.
Put simply, the president’s resolution declared that the constitutional powers of the State of Durango had disappeared, and Dupre Ceniceros along with them. Thus the governor became a “constitutional non-person” who could be ignored. The constitutional intricacies were confusing to many Mexicans who felt that Diaz Ordaz had crack6d down too harshly, One person told me he searched his constitution in vain to find any authority for Dupre Ceniceros’ removal* (Diaz 0rdaz’ message to the commission, ironically, was signed “Sufragio efectivo, no reeleccion.” (Effective suffrage, no reelection) The salutation, found on all official Mexican governmental correspondences was one of the earlier Revolutionary rallying cries.
After Diaz Ordaz’ resolution was read, four members of the commission filed out of the salon to study it and report back a dictamen – judgment or opinion – to their colleagues. There was no “hearing” In the U.S. congressional sense, simply a private conference of the legislators. Meanwhile the session continued with routine business: invitations to public ceremonies; a message from the governor of Campeche on routine state business; permission for various Mexican diplomats to accept foreign decorations offered by nations in which they had been stationed.
Then the committee returned with its verdict: Constitutional government indeed had vanished in Durango; further, when the “preservation of constitutional order” in the Republic is involved, all the people of Mexico have interests that are inseparable from. those of the people of Durango. Thus a new state governor was necessary.
Another deputy arose to agree, stating that on a trip to Durango in July he noted a “radical lack of moral authority, political direction and intellectual guidance.” He faulted three major groups: The student strike leaders, the business community that organized in their support, and the PRI sectors the governor supposedly was to direct.
The deputies sat for a moment in dead silence; then, realizing the script was completed, they broke into applause. The secret vote was unanimous by the 25 members still on the floor, two having left for unexplained reasons. Eight minutes later the commission unanimously voted the provisional governorship to Deputy Angel Rodriguez Solorzano, a former rector of the University of Juarez in Durango city, from whence came many of the students who had occupied the Cerro de Mercado.
Total lapsed time from convening to swearing-in of the replacement: One hour 55 minutes,
Two happenings in Durango added a poignant note to Dupre Ceniceros’ political obituary. When reporters first got to him and asked about the Permanent Commission’s action he stated, “I have no plans to resign….I know nothing of this.” And when news of the ouster became official the Durango telegraph office was deluged by thousands of persons seeking to send Diaz Ordaz congratulations for his action. This same city, in 1962, gave Dupres Cenicaros more than 90 percent of the gubernatorial vote.
Although the subject wasn’t discussed in the Permanent Commission at the time, the same vote that “replaced” Dupre Ceniceros also put out of office the entire state legislature. So acting governor Rodriquez Solorzano is busy in the state now, arranging legislative elections set for Oct. 2, trying to establish a firm date for the gubernatorial election.
To this foreign observer the most surprising feature of the shakeup was its lack of impact on the Mexican political consciousness. Mexico City dailies hailed Diaz Ordaz’ move; there were two days of comments by assorted political leaders and political hacks; civic groups in Durango bought full page newspaper ads (part of the daily political routine here) to add their blessings. The only dissent audible in the clamor came from the minutely-minority Partido Accion Nacional, the National Action Party, or PAN, a conservative group. PAN said that the firing, “if” it actually were necessary, should have been cone by the Senate without presidential intervention; Diaz Ordaz’ initiation of the action “sets a dangerous precedent,” PAN alleged. (Whoever put out this PAN statement apparently was ignorant of or oblivious to past ousters engineered by Cardenas and other presidents.)
In one sense – and this argument is repeated with conviction by Mexican politicians – the removal was an indication of the strength# rather than the absence, of Mexican democracy. Said a member of the Chamber of Deputies who isn’t particularly friendly to Diaz Ordaz: “The familia revolucionaria is responsible for Dupre Ceniceros because it put him into office. He was a PRI candidate, and thus PRI and the familia assumed responsibility for whatever he did. I think they acted wisely in removing him. I don’t agree with your norte-americano system under which you continue an inefficient man in office even when the entire nation recognizes that he is no good. We Mexicans at least have the courage to push our incompetents into the street when they fail.”
Received in New York September 13, 1966
©1966 Joseph C. Goulden, Jr.
Mr. Goulden is a 1965 Alicia Patterson Fund fellowship winner on leave from The Philadelphia Inquirer.Permission to publish this article may be sought from The Managing Editor, Philadelphia Inquirer.
